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A Theory of Participatory Budgeting Decision Making as a Form of Empowerment 
Abstract 
There is a growing literature concerning participatory budgeting (PB), which transfers 
some element of budgetary decision making from the executive or legislature to citizens. During 
the earlier years of development, this practice was found primarily in less developed countries. 
Early PB reoriented government expenditures to better focus on the needs of the populace. 
Substantial shares of the budget were allocated through participatory process (Souza, 2001). PB 
is alternative claimed as an example of participatory democracy and deliberative democracy. 
This paper considers issues related to these theories and further develops a distinctive budgetary 
theory of participatory budgeting. 
  
  
Introduction 
Generally speaking, participatory budgeting (“PB”) is a process that “allows the participation 
of non-elected citizens in the conception and/or allocation of public finances” (Sintomer, 
Herzberg, & Röcke, 2008, p. 168). This approach to citizen-engagement in the public budgeting 
and allocation process began in Brazilian cities, and has since spread to more than 3,000 cities 
(Su, 2017) in at least 15 different countries (Goldfrank, 2012). PB is increasingly popular as a 
concept among social reformers, subnational governmental elected officials, academics, and 
other researchers. Despite its popularity, Wampler (2012) notes that while PB can empower 
citizens, enhance democracy, and increase overall well-being, PB can also act as a way for 
governments to legitimize themselves by co-opting activists pushing for more democratization.  
Despite the general enthusiasm for PB by academics and activists, the topic has received 
little attention in the public administration literature and its definition is relatively amorphous 
(Miller, Hildreth, & Stewart, 2017a). Accordingly, what is referred to as “PB” takes numerous 
and various forms. In fact, Ganuza and Baiocchi (2012, p. 1) note, “To speak of Participatory 
Budgeting today is to speak of a seemingly infinitely malleable set of institutions.” Lacking a 
coherent theory and taxonomy limits the ability to incorporate this important contemporary 
phenomenon into public administration and budgeting literatures. 
In this paper, we examine whether PB refocuses public capital spending through increased 
public engagement and reflects genuine transfer of significant decision-making power from 
officials to the residents, or is instead a symbolic process that co-opts residents, deflecting their 
desire for budgetary influence through merely symbolic decision-making. To address this 
research question, we first detail the characteristics of PB in its varying forms, and then detail the 
history and spread of PB across the globe, focusing on how the practice has or has not changed 
public spending due to a change in decision-making locus. We build a theory and typology of 
PB, which allows for research hypotheses and predictions about how allocations are affected 
depending on which parties are involved. We use the PB process in New York City to 
empirically test our theory, and find that in this case, PB is a trivial budget exercise that does not 
transfer decision-making from elected officials to residents.  
Characteristics of Participatory Budgeting Institutions 
Any comparative research faces a definition problem. In the case of participatory budgeting, 
this problem is significant because very different forms of citizen participation in budget 
allocation procedures exist in different national settings. In some cases, the term “participatory 
budgeting” refers to an informative event connected with the budget but lacking significant 
consultation with citizens. Other examples, however, which are not referred to as “participatory 
budgeting,” may feature an intensive citizen engagement component. This is why one cannot 
rely on a ‘nominalist’ definition, based only on the denomination of the process as “participatory 
budgeting,” in order to make a comparison. An ontological definition that would aim to define 
what participatory budgeting should be, at any time and in any country, does not seem legitimate, 
because this procedure is different in different countries and because sociologists can hardly 
define the essence of a procedure or institution (Sintomer, Herzberg, and Röcke 2008, p. 168).  
A political (or normative) definition would be possible, but this is not the aim of this article. 
It is therefore necessary to develop a methodological definition, which includes a set of minimal 
requisites in order to clearly differentiate this participatory procedure from others (such as the 
allocation of neighborhood funds with citizen input) and which, at the same time, is 
comprehensive enough to give sufficient leeway to procedures with different specificities 
(Sintomer, Herzberg, and Röcke 2008). While not exhaustive, the subsequent characteristics are 
intended to somewhat concretize an amorphous and diverse institution. As discussed after, these 
different practices themselves inform the theoretical perspectives of this paper.  
In principle, participatory budgeting allows citizens or residents to vote for specific public 
projects, which will then be implemented by governments, and which often include a value-
based component emphasizing social justice (Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). These different 
participants in the PB process likely have different goals (redistribution for poor participants 
versus maintaining budgetary control for politicians), which can lead to conflicts and challenges. 
Shah (2007, p. 1) defines PB as a “direct-democracy approach to budgeting” that has the benefits 
of (1) educating and engaging citizens on the processes of governance; (2) improving delivery of 
services by increasing transparency, accountability, and efficiency while also tackling corruption 
and clientelism; and (3) providing opportunity for marginalized groups to directly participate in 
budgeting decisions. This last characteristic is particularly relevant because it implies that one 
benefit of PB is a change (immediate or gradual) in where public moneys are spent because of a 
change in where significant budgetary decisions are made (residents versus public officials).  
The limited existing literature on PB suggests that advocates view it similarly to the way that 
early twentieth century public administration activists, such as Frank Goodnow and William H. 
Allen, viewed their reforms of their era. These early activists advocated for a professional civil 
service to reduce corruption and patronage, increase citizen engagement, and increase the 
efficiency of public service delivery (Allen, 1908; Goodnow, 1900; Williams & Lee, 2008). 
Similarly, PB scholars view the practice as a means of an increasingly engaged citizenry shifting 
spending priorities, as well as improving transparency and reducing the role of patronage by 
elected officials. Further, PB is seen as a means of improving democratic outcomes by directly 
involving and increasing the participation of normally marginalized populations, which is also 
expected to shift how public moneys are spent. In the next sections, we examine the 
implementation of PB in several contexts in order to develop a theory and taxonomy of 
participatory budgeting, and how PB is expected to change the allocation of public budgets. 
The History of Participatory Budgeting 
Cabannes (2004) divides the history of PB into three phases, starting with experimentation in 
Porto Alegre, Brazil and other cities during the 1990s. Subsequently PB spread more widely 
within Brazil during the late 1990s, and then beyond Brazil to Latin America, Europe, and 
beyond, with various modifications along the way.  
The Beginning of Participatory Budgeting 
In Porto Alegre, where PB in its modern form was first implemented, the process included 
shifting budgeting from a regional to a programmatic focus, which explicitly changed the rules 
of conduct and goals of politics (Wampler, 2012, p. 2). Essentially, this changed budgeting from 
“where” money was spent to which public goods were being financed and for whom. Other 
notable features in the Porto Alegre PB efforts included allowing anyone to participate. This was 
novel - especially in budgeting. This was not without friction, however, as established 
neighborhood associations saw their influence as intermediaries between citizens and elected 
officials reduced (Baiocchi, 2001). As a result of this direct democracy, politicians saw their own 
influence reduced as well, which in turn reduced cronyism (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012).  
In short, the reforms in Porto Alegre were substantial in nature, scope, and effects, and saw 
significant changes to how public moneys were spent. Baiocchi and Ganuza (2014) argue that 
this combination of accommodating democratic decision-making and substantive outcomes is 
what makes PB significant. The early substantive outcome of PB was associated with increased 
spending on basic sanitation and health care, and a reduction in infant mortality rates (Gonçalves, 
2014). PB in Porto Alegre also had a redistributive effect because projects were directed more 
proportionately to poor areas once the citizens of these regions were able to more directly budget 
for these outcomes. Further, substantial shares of the budget (10 percent to 21 percent) were 
allocated through the participatory process (Souza, 2001). Although PB in Porto Alegre did not 
reach the extremely poor, the process was an improvement from a social justice perspective 
compared to the prior clientelist system in which communities received projects largely as 
political rewards only (Souza, 2001). Boulding and Wampler (2010) analyze data from 220 
Brazilian cities and observe that PB is associated with increased spending on healthcare and 
small decreases in poverty, but caution that PB is likely to have limited impact on social justice 
when combined with only limited budgetary resources.  
The Spread of PB 
Following the perceived success of PB in Porto Alegre, PB spread across Brazil through the 
networks of the Worker’s Party, extended across Latin America through related political 
networks, promoted by civil society, and finally spread beyond Latin America and across the 
globe in the 2000s after international organizations, development agencies, and activists were 
introduced to the model at the 2005 World Social Forum (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014). Thus, in 
addition to the pull-factors of the inspiring example provided by the Porto Alegre-model of PB, 
there are push-factors behind the global spread of PB, as international development agencies, 
such as the World Bank, UN Habitat, and agencies of individual countries such as USAID 
adopted a pro-PB policy stance (Goldfrank, 2007). The World Bank, for example, has supported 
programs promoting PB and provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of PB in at least 
15 countries (Goldfrank, 2012). However, the World Bank version of PB is criticized as lacking 
social justice components that limit significant shifts in public spending.1  
Regardless of the initial motivations, the global spread of PB has been accompanied by 
ambiguity in the purposes and characteristics of PB (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012), which has the 
potential to limit the effect of PB on budgets. The ambiguity carries the risk of PB becoming a 
superficial project with weak links to decision-making and small budgets with rigid rules for 
spending (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014), which  contrasts with the successful Porto Alegre PB, in 
which citizens not only participated, but had the power to define the terms of their participation 
and shifted large shares of the municipal budget. Importantly, this weaker version may reflect 
symbolic democratization that co-opts, rather than empowers, participants. A process such as this 
would be expected to have limited to no effect on budgetary allocations because decision-making 
has not shifted from public officials to the citizenry in any meaningful way. Ganuza & Baiocchi 
(2012) distinguish between PB as a policy instrument in its early stage – a way to alter how 
citizens, civil society, and the government interact – and PB as a policy device in its later stage – 
a simple neutral initiative that may improve governance. 
Sintomer et al. (2008) divide the PB processes in Europe into those with robust mechanisms 
for wider citizen engagement combined with active civil society engagement, contrasted with the 
ones where the process was merely superficial. Only the former ones produce the desired results, 
such as (1) transparency regarding public budgets and specific projects, and (2) improved 
administrative efficiency and responsiveness towards citizens including changes to budget 
allocations, especially the poor. Baiocchi and Ganuza (2014) find that some processes included 
direct decision-making, while others were merely consultations; most were open to all in 
                                                          
1 Incidentally, this value neutrality may have contributed to the global spread because it is politically acceptable to 
potential opponents (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012).  
principle, some used lottery to select participants, and some included organized groups as 
opposed to individual citizens and residents; and that usually PB is just one tool to link the local 
governments to citizens, causing frictions with other existing processes. These distinctions in the 
process clearly influence the ability of PB to alter budget allocations by shifting decision-making 
more directly to the people as conceived in Brazil. 
Allegretti and Herzberg (2004) find that PB in Germany during the early 2000s was very 
centralized, with decisions made by city councils with only selective regard for citizen input. PB 
in Germany was not intended to be redistributive, but was a way to modernize governance and 
make it more open, and as such German PB is typically consultative in nature (Ruesch & 
Wagner, 2013). The challenges German PB has faced include declining participation and a lack 
of representativeness, the polar opposite of the outcomes in early PB practices in Brazil. Further, 
PB in Germany had limited budgetary allocative effect, perhaps because of the asymmetry in 
parties’ power as well as its intent to not redistribute towards more marginalized populations. 
Observations elsewhere in Europe reflect evolving PB practices. With the Portuguese 
experiences with PB, Alves and Allegretti (2012) distinguish between “first generation” PB that 
was ideological and consultative, and “second generation” PB which was characterized by more 
shared decision-making powers. In Italy, Bassoli (2012) notes that the PB process faces 
challenges about whether it is merely advisory, or whether the participants’ decisions are 
binding. These evolving practices have tended to limit the effects of popularly determined (as 
opposed to determined by public officials) budget allocations resulting from PB processes. In 
general, the European with PB supports the notion that PB was merely a policy device that did 
not shift decision-making downwards, or significantly alter how public money was allocated. 
  
Participatory Budgeting in North America 
The first documented instance of PB in North America is in Guelph, Canada, beginning in 
1999 (Pinnington, Lerner, & Schugurensky, 2009). The Guelph project used deliberative 
processes to allocate unrestricted grant funding that was partly awarded from the municipal 
government. The first United States municipality to adopt PB was Chicago in 2009 (Stewart, 
Miller, Hildreth, & Wright-Phillips, 2014). Alderman Joe Moore of Chicago’s 49th Ward devoted 
$1.3 million of his discretionary budget to PB (Lerner & Secondo, 2012). While PB in the 49th 
Ward has shifted spending patterns by including such project options such as murals and 
community gardens, it has faced criticism for failing to include significant proportions of citizens 
- and especially minorities - and for its rigid rules set by the alderman’s staff (Stewart et al., 
2014). Thus, PB in Chicago, though still expanding, has lacked the empowerment dimension 
seen in Latin American examples (Pin, 2017a), and has not significantly transferred decision-
making from elected officials - which is expected to limit the allocative effects from PB as well.  
PB in Chicago did succeed, however, in setting a precedent and an example for further 
adaptations across the United States. Hagelskamp, Rinehart, Silliman, and Schleifer (2016) 
document 13 North American cities (with 46 districts) engaged in participatory budgeting in the 
2014-2015 decision (voting) year. This appears to be an undercount as it is fairly easy to find 
communities not included in this report that have engaged in the process during that year 
("Greensboro Participatory Budgeting Handbook 2015 - 2016," 2015; Tariq & Fletcher, 2016). 
While no firm count exists from a single reliable source, Public Agenda, an organization that 
promotes participatory budgeting, continues to show dispersion to communities not reported in 
earlier years as of late 2017 ("Participatory Budgeting," 2017). Where discernable from these 
reports, the common approach involves council members who allocate part or all of an office’s 
discretionary budget allowance to citizen or resident decision-making. Whether these shifts in 
the locus of decision-making affect how public moneys are spent remains an unexplored 
empirical question. 
The Political Theory of Participatory Budgeting 
The domain of democratic theory to which participatory budgeting belongs is disputed. Both 
theorists of deliberative democracy (Baiocchi, 2001; Fung & Wright, 2001; Pin, 2017b) and 
those of participatory democracy (Hilmer, 2010; Pateman, 2012; Stewart et al., 2014) claim this 
practice as evidence of their respective domain’s living practices. To further confound this 
dispute, some deliberative democratic theorists claim to fully subsume participatory democracy 
within their domain (Fung & Wright, 2001; Hildreth, 2012; Pin, 2017b), which claim is 
vigorously disputed by some participatory democratic theorists (Hilmer, 2010; Jackson, 2015; 
Pateman, 2012). Others are either ambiguous (Fung, 2006, 2007; Kaswan, 2011; Miller, 
Hildreth, & Stewart, 2017b) or, in one case, skeptical of both domains (Mutz, 2006). Even 
further in one instance, procedures that look very much like a participatory budgeting are labeled 
direct democracy (Beath, Christia, & Enikolopov, 2017). 
What all of these theory domains have in common is that they focus on a decision-making 
process in the hands of the population-at-large under various guises as opposed to decision by 
elected representatives. This focus is a rejection of the dominant western democratic political 
theory of the 20th century which limits the role of the population to selecting leaders, who are to 
use their own judgment to decide on political matters, while possibly taking into account the 
views as communicated by organized groups. Pateman (1970) examines these earlier theories at 
length, assigning the root of this pluralistic view to Joseph Schumpeter (1942), Robert Dahl 
(1956) and others. Individuals may be represented through their membership in interest groups, 
Madisonian factions (Dahl, 1967, 1998). Their different aspects are represented by different 
groups. It is not so much individuals themselves who are represented, their interests are 
represented. This line of reasoning denies a direct decision-making role for the population; 
according to some of these theorists, to the degree of rejecting communication about preferences 
from voters to their representatives (Kaswan, 2011). The theory of representative democracy 
may be labeled pluralist, polyarchist, elitist, or a variety of other things, although it is not 
necessarily the case that all forms of participatory theory are exempt from all of these labels. The 
core feature that participatory theorists reject is elitism, the presumption that the great mass of 
humanity are incapable of governing themselves democratically and thus their democratic role 
should be limited to selecting leaders who make decisions in their behalf (Kaufman, 1960). 
Kaufman argues this view of human nature can be empirically examined through democratic 
experiments. Regardless of the specific label designated for participatory budgeting, when it is 
fully implemented as in the Porto Alegre case, it is such an experiment. Nevertheless, the 
advocates of these participatory processes consider the participatory process itself as the primary 
benefit to consider. Pateman (1970), for example, treats education in democracy as the benefit, 
while Baiocchi and Lerner (2007), among others, focus on the role of deliberative democracy in 
legitimating governance. 
Fung (2006) describes three dimensions of participation: (1) participant selection, (2) 
authority and power, and (3) communication and decision. Miller et al. (2017b) breaks Fung’s 
communication and decision-making dimensions into two separate dimensions. Both of these 
models treat these dimensions as linear which collective merge at their minimums and they 
include many of the features associated with the various contra-Schumpeterian theories, although 
they do not explicitly express a view about Schumpeterianism. However, there are suggestions; 
for example, Fung finds legitimacy-enhancing deliberation at the intersection of communicative 
influence, open self-selection, and express preferences. Presumably, expert administration is part 
of elitist (Schumpeterian) government; however, it is not clear how this combines with diffuse 
public (participation in voting behavior) as these two characteristics are far apart on the same 
dimension.  
A Budgetary Theory and Typology of Participatory Budgeting 
While theories develop a citizen or resident based democratic decision theory, they generally 
omit the requirement that the decisions are in fact substantial. They focus, instead on 
perceptions of legitimacy and education in democracy. From a budgetary perspective, what is 
significant is the decision. We use the history of PB practices across the globe to articulate a 
comprehensive theory and typology of PB decision-making, and the effect of this decision-
making on which types of public projects receive funding. Early PB developed in three 
significant dimensions as shown in Figure 1: 
• It expanded the access to budget decision making by engaging a broad array of citizens or 
residents; 
• It provided these participants control over a significant share of public resources; and 
• Most importantly for our purposes, it reallocated funds from purposes preferred by elites 
and experts, to those preferred by the newly empowered population. 
The effect of this redirection of decision-making and, as a result, public money has been to 
provide more equitable access to governmentally funded projects. That is, PB in its original 
incarnation sought to transfer significant decision-making power from public officials to 
residents, especially those usually excluded from budgetary decisions. Figure 1 shows that each 
of these dimensions can be understood as a continuum from minimal engagement to 
transformative change. 
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Figure 1 Dimensions of Participatory Budgeting 
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The first dimension, labeled a - b in Figure 1A,2 ranges from consultation to direct 
democracy. In the consultative form, engaged residents may select projects and expenditure 
plans, but these are treated as recommendations to more traditional political actors, elected 
officials, and governmental experts. At the opposite end of the continuum, through direct 
democracy, the PB selections are decided. The role of elected officials and government officials 
is to implement these decisions. The range of this continuum may reflect the degree to which the 
governmental participants can influence or veto decisions made by the public. This control may 
be subtle – for example, government actors may reject projects as not meeting funding 
requirements as a capital project, or making the project cost estimation prohibitively expensive. 
Alternatively, it may be overt – for example, government actors may have a formal role in the 
project selection process and decision-making, not leaving it exclusively to residents. 
The second dimension, labeled c - d in Figure 1A, involves the amount of resources affected 
by decisions or recommendations made through the participatory process. In early Porto Alegre 
experience, the share of total annual expenditures was substantial, as much as 21 percent, 
although it varied widely for reported years. On the other hand, some literature shows that in 
more developed countries, the share may be much smaller, reflecting the discretionary funds 
controlled by a single legislator. More significant decisions in this dimension reflect larger shares 
of resources. 
 The third dimension, labeled e - f in Figure 1A, reflects the degree by which resources are 
redirected. More significant redirection of resources involves changing the purpose for which 
public resources are spent and the beneficiaries of these resources. Early PB redirected resources 
to basic needs in neglected communities; that is, the use of this money is reported to redirect both 
                                                          
2 The three dimensions shown in Figure 1A are shown in paired relationships in Figures 1B, 1C, and 1D. 
purpose and beneficiaries of funds. More minimal redirection may involve selection of projects 
without power to shift the purpose or beneficiaries of funding. 
As shown in Figure 1A, we label direct democracy affecting substantial resources and 
substantial redirection (reallocation) as “Full PB,” while consultation with less significant 
resources and minimal redirection is labeled “Symbolic PB.” This symbolic PB may be thought 
of as the co-option of residents by public officials and elites, which may deflect the potential 
budgetary influence of PB itself. Where a municipality’s PB system falls in Figures 1B-D helps 
predict the outcomes from PB. With the history and theory of PB thus articulated and a typology 
developed, we turn now to a specific case of PB to apply and test this theory with specific 
hypotheses. 
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 Figure 2 shows that the reallocation dimension can be further subdivided into three 
components, each of which can be classified as low (no reallocation) or high (substantial 
reallocation). The g-h dimension reflects reallocation by program. In early PB this might be from 
aesthetic uses to basic infrastructure. The i-j dimension reflects reallocation by location, 
considering the empowerment objective, it may reflect redirecting funds from wealthy 
neighborhoods to poor ones. The k-l dimension reflects reallocation by size and number of 
grants. For a fixed amount of money small grants can be distributed to more beneficiary groups. 
This form of reallocation is ambiguous with respect to the point of participatory budgeting. 
While it may provide funding to more beneficiaries (thus reflecting empowerment), it may also 
reflect use of participatory budgeting by powerful officials to more fine-tune their use of 
patronage to gain votes, which is contrary to the anti-clientelistic purposes of participatory 
processes. 
These dimensions are quite distinct from those previously discussed as they focus not on 
abstract issues such as the presence of bureaucratic decision making, but on much more concrete 
and measurable factors related to decision making. They, therefore, provide a greater opportunity 
to observe the decision-making effect of participatory budgeting. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper has developed a theory of participation budgetary decision making with the aim 
of defining clear measurable dimensions of decision making that clarify the degree to which 
participatory budgeting is a form of direct democracy as compared with a symbolic exercise. 
Three major dimensions are defined and one of those is further developed into three 
subdimensions. These dimensions can be used for examination of specific instances of 
participatory budgeting to determine the degree to which power is shifted to the population at 
large through direct democracy as compared with the degree that it is symbolically transferred 
while actually maintaining an elite-pluralist form of governance. 
 
Bibliography 
Allegretti, G., & Herzberg, C. (2004). Participatory budgets in Europe: Between efficiency and growing 
local democracy. Retrieved from Amsterdam, the Netherlands: 
https://estudogeral.sib.uc.pt/jspui/bitstream/10316/41002/1/Participatory%20budgets%20in%
20Europe_Between%20efficiency%20and%20growing%20local%20democracy.pdf 
Allen, W. H. (1908). Efficient democracy. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company. 
Alves, M. L., & Allegretti, G. (2012). (In)stability, a key element to understand participatory budgeting: 
Discussing Portuguese cases. Journal of Public Deliberation, 8(2), Online at 
http://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol8/iss2/art3.  
Baiocchi, G. (2001). Participation, Activism, and Politics: The Porto Alegre Experiment and Deliberative 
Democratic Theory Politics & Society, 29(1), 43-72.  
Baiocchi, G., & Ganuza, E. (2014). Participatory Budgeting as if Emancipation Mattered. Politics & 
Society, 42(1), 29-50. doi:10.1177/0032329213512978 
Baiocchi, G., & Lerner, J. (2007). Could Participatory Budgeting Work in the United States? The Good 
Society, 16(1), 8-13.  
Bassoli, M. (2012). Participatory Budgeting in Italy: An Analysis of (Almost Democratic) Participatory 
Governance Arrangements. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 36(6), 1183-
1203. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2427.2011.01023.x 
Beath, A., Christia, F., & Enikolopov, R. (2017). Direct democracy and resource allocation: Experimental 
evidence from Afghanistan. Journal of Development Economics, 124, 199-213.  
Boulding, C., & Wampler, B. (2010). Voice, Votes, and Resources: Evaluating the Effect of Participatory 
Democracy on Well-being. World Development, 38(1), 125-135. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.05.002 
Cabannes, Y. (2004). Participatory budgeting: a significant contribution to participatory democracy. 
Environment and Urbanization, 16(1), 27-46. doi:10.1177/095624780401600104 
Dahl, R. A. (1956). A preface to democratic theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Dahl, R. A. (1967). The city in the future of democracy. American Political Science Review, 61(4), 953-
970.  
Dahl, R. A. (1998). On democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Fung, A. (2006). Varieties of participation in complex governance. Public Administration Review, 66, 66-
75.  
Fung, A. (2007). Democratic Theory and Political Science: A Pragmatic Method of Constructive 
Engagement. The American Political Science Review, 101(3), 443-458.  
Fung, A., & Wright, E. O. (2001). Deepening democracy: innovations in empowered participatory 
governance. Politics & Society, 29(1), 5-41.  
Ganuza, E., & Baiocchi, G. (2012). The Power of Ambiguity: How Participatory Budgeting Travels the 
Globe. Journal of Public Deliberation, 8(2), Online at 
https://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol8/iss2/art8.  
Goldfrank, B. (2007). Lessons from Latin American experience in participatory budgeting. Participatory 
budgeting, 143, 91-126.  
Goldfrank, B. (2012). The world bank and the globalization of participatory budgeting. Journal of Public 
Deliberation, 8(2), Online at https://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol8/iss2/art7/.  
Gonçalves, S. (2014). The Effects of Participatory Budgeting on Municipal Expenditures and Infant 
Mortality in Brazil. World Development, 53(January), 94-110. 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.01.009 
Goodnow, F. J. (1900). Politics and administration: A study in government. New York: Macmillan. 
Greensboro Participatory Budgeting Handbook 2015 - 2016. (2015). In. 
Hagelskamp, C., Rinehart, C., Silliman, R., & Schleifer, D. (2016). Public Spending, by the People. 
Participatory Budgeting in the United States and Canada in 2014--15. Retrieved from 
https://www.publicagenda.org/files/PublicSpendingByThePeople_PublicAgenda_2016.pdf 
Hildreth, R. W. (2012). Word and Deed: A Deweyan Integration of Deliberative and Participatory 
Democracy. New Political Science, 34(3), 295-320. doi:10.1080/07393148.2012.703852 
Hilmer, J. D. (2010). The State of Participatory Democratic Theory. New Political Science, 32(1), 43-63. 
doi:10.1080/07393140903492118 
Jackson, J. (2015). Dividing deliberative and participatory democracy through John Dewey. Democratic 
Theory, 2(1), 63-84.  
Kaswan, M. J. (2011). A Bridge to Nowhere: Connecting Representative and Radical Models of 
Democracy. International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior, 14(4), 514-536.  
Kaufman, A. S. (1960). Human nature and participatory democracy. In C. Friedrich (Ed.), Responsibility: 
NOMOS III (Vol. 3, pp. 266-289). 
Lerner, J., & Secondo, D. (2012). By the People, For the People: Participatory Budgeting from the Bottom 
Up in North America. Journal of Public Deliberation, 8(2), Online at 
https://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol8/iss2/art2.  
Miller, S. A., Hildreth, R., & Stewart, L. M. (2017a). The Modes of Participation: A Revised Frame for 
Identifying and Analyzing Participatory Budgeting Practices. Administration & Society, online a 
thttps://doi-org/10.1177/0095399717718325.  
Miller, S. A., Hildreth, R., & Stewart, L. M. (2017b). The Modes of Participation: A Revised Frame for 
Identifying and Analyzing Participatory Budgeting Practices. Administration & Society, 
0095399717718325.  
Mutz, D. C. (2006). Hearing the other side: Deliberative versus participatory democracy: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Participatory Budgeting. (2017). Retrieved from https://www.publicagenda.org/pages/projects-
participatory-budgeting 
Pateman, C. (1970). Participation and democratic theory: Cambridge University Press. 
Pateman, C. (2012). APSA Presidential Address: Participatory Democracy Revisited. Perspectives on 
Politics, 10(1), 7-19.  
Pin, L. (2017a). Does Participatory Budgeting Lead to Local Empowerment? The Case of Chicago, IL. 
Alternate Routes: a Journal of Critical Social Research, 28, 114-140.  
Pin, L. (2017b). Does Participatory Budgeting Lead to Local Empowerment? The Case of Chicago, IL. 
Alternate Routes: a Journal of Critical Social Research, 28.  
Pinnington, E., Lerner, J., & Schugurensky, D. (2009). Participatory Budgeting in North America: The Case 
of Guelph, Canada. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, 21(3), 
454-481.  
Ruesch, M. A., & Wagner, M. (2013). Participatory Budgeting in Germany: Citizens as Consultants. 
Esperanca Democrática. Retrieved from 
https://www.buergerhaushalt.org/en/article/participatory-budgeting-germany-citizens-
consultants-overview 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. New York, London: Harper & Brothers. 
Shah, A. (2007). Overview. In A. Shah (Ed.), Participatory Budgeting: Public Sector Governance and 
Accountability (pp. 1-18). Washington DC: World Bank. 
Sintomer, Y., Herzberg, C., & Röcke, A. (2008). Participatory Budgeting in Europe: Potentials and 
Challenges. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 32(1), 164-178. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2427.2008.00777.x 
Souza, C. (2001). Participatory budgeting in Brazilian cities: limits and possibilities in building democratic 
institutions. Environment and Urbanization, 13(1), 159-184. doi:10.1177/095624780101300112 
Stewart, L. M., Miller, S. A., Hildreth, R., & Wright-Phillips, M. V. (2014). Participatory Budgeting in the 
United States: A Preliminary Analysis of Chicago's 49th Ward Experiment. New Political Science, 
36(2), 193-218.  
Su, C. (2017). From Porto Alegre to New York City: Participatory Budgeting and Democracy. CUNY 
Academic Works. Retrieved from http://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_pubs/305 
Tariq, M., & Fletcher, S. (2016, 06/19/2016). The Guelph Neighbourhood Support Coalition Retrieved 
from http://participedia.net/en/cases/guelph-neighbourhood-support-coalition 
Wampler, B. (2012). Participatory Budgeting: Core principles and Key Impacts. Journal of Public 
Deliberation, 8(2), Online at https://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol8/iss2/art12.  
Wampler, B., & Hartz-Karp, J. (2012). Participatory Budgeting: Diffusion and Outcomes Across the World. 
Journal of Public Deliberation, 8(2), Online at 
https://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol8/iss2/art13.  
Williams, D. W., & Lee, M. (2008). Déjà Vu All Over Again: Contemporary Traces of the Early 1900s’ the 
'Budget Exhibit'. The American Review of Public Administration, 38(2), 203-224. 
doi:DOI:10.1177/0275074007303181 
 
